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suggest that the experience of other countries, with a different history and 
different kinds of union, may not be a safe guide here. 
The rest of the book urges responsibility upon both sides of the 
bargaining table, with the sharpest digs and the most exhortation reserved 
for the labor side of it. 
The writing is marred by occasional carelessness or clumsiness, but 
in general is clear and easy to read. And it would be ungracious indeed 
to be captious, where the slips occasionally furnish such pleasure as does 
the reference (p. 357) to an infant labor movement "in dawdling clothes." 
Nor are the gems all inadvertent, either, for Mr. Teller was inspired 
when he referred to Hunt v. Crmnboch, (325 U. S. 821) a case arising 
out of a murder, as "the culmination of the homicide committed upon the 
courts by the Norris Act." 
Like all Mr. Teller's writings, this book is a thought-provoking con-
tribution to a vitally important field. 
Bertram F. Willco:t'.t 
PRINCIPLEs OF THE LAw OF CoNTRACTS. By Grover C. Grismore. The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1947. pp. lxiii, 538. $6.00. 
In traditional style, Professor Grismore has carefully and thoroughly 
treated in the traditional way all of the traditional principles of the l~w 
of Contracts. Here, then, is a book tailor-made for the traditional re-
:view. The reviewer has only to make the traditional assumption that any 
such meticulous restatement of a body of concepts is automatically a 
contribution to legal literature and his plan of attack is clear. An ap-
preciative recognition of a painstaking piece of work, an involved dis-
agreement or two with the author's statement of some insignificant bits 
of doctrine (inserted both to prove he read the book and to preserve his 
reputation for independence of thought) and the reviewer has added to his 
bibliography another evidence of his productivity as a scholar. 
There is, unfortunately, an insurmountable obstacle to my use of 
such a technique: I cannot bring myself to make the necessary basic 
assumption. For I doubt, in the first place, whether any te:l\.i: which 
sets out to clarify the law by carefully constructing a card house of con-
cepts can ever do more good than it does harm. The seeming stability 
of such a logical structure-achieved only by divorcing doctrine from the 
reality of the individual case-lulls too many students into a false sense 
of security. That most students admittedly and understandably yearn 
for such security makes placing such a book in their hands all the more 
hazardous. Such a card house can safely be used only if constant class-
room exposure clearly demonstrates that factual jars and drafts make 
card houses collapse. Employed by able and understanding teachers, the 
structure has some utility in introducing students to the way courts and 
lawyers talk about the solution of disputes. In the hands of unimaginative 
teachers, who themselves believe that such a restatement contains the 
answers to important questions in the law, it is -a dangerous instrument. 
The competent teacher has no need of it. The incompetent teacher cannot 
teach without it. 
But even conceding that such a carefully built card house has some 
pedagogical value, the need is scarcely great enough to justify row housing. 
t Associate Professor, Cornell University Law School. 
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The law of Contracts has already been stated and restated. Unless, there-
fore, Professor Grismore's structure (1) is built on new conceptual ground 
or (2) adds a more attractively designed unit to the old row of paste-
board fronts, it is a needless piece of construction. How does the book 
stand up when measured even by these limited standards? 
Since Professor Grismore states in his preface that his sole purpose 
has been to "present the fundamental principles of the law of Contracts 
as clearly and concisely as possible," and that "the choice of topics has 
been determined very largely by the conventional basic Law School course 
on the subject," 1 his book could hardly be expected to break new concep-
tual ground. And any hope that this statement of his objectives might 
perhaps be overly modest is dashed once the book is examined. So far 
as subject matter is concerned, Professor Grismore has done exactly what 
he set out to do. Except for some rephrasing and rearranging of already 
established concept patterns, he has nothing to offer which is not already 
supplied in too great abundance by the Restatement of Contracts and 
Williston's Students' Edition. 
How, then, does the book stand up on the second count? For any 
book that presents even well worn doctrine in a refreshing and interesting 
way, that really manages to clarify the subject by explaining the traditional 
concepts in simple and down-to-earth language, that is-in short-a use-
ful textbook, still deserves publication. Personally I should rate any such 
book a genuine contribution if it did no more than help dispel the notion 
that law must be presented as dull and big-worded stuff. How about 
Professor Grismore's book? A sample of the text gives the answer. 
Here, for instance, is the author's explanation of the difference between a 
·contract and a sale: 2 
"At other times the word [contract] is used to designate a cer-
tain transaction, such as a sale or a conveyance, which arises out of 
an agreement and results in new legal relationships, but does not 
involve any undertaking to do or to refrain from doing anything in 
the future. Thus, if A sells and delivers an automobile to B and is paid 
a price therefor, it is sometimes ~aid that a contract has been created. 
This is not a contract in the sense in which the word has been de-
scribed above, but a sale. Such an agreement creates no outstanding 
obligation but effects at once a transfer of rights in rem. However, 
it is otherwise when there is coupled with such a transaction one or 
more undertakings for the future, as when the future delivery of the 
goods, or the future payment of the price or. a warranty is provided 
for. In such a case a contract in the sense indicated results, as well 
as a sale." 
Ten pages of passages like this, complete with footnotes, were more 
than enough to spike my hope that here I might find-at last and at 
least-a simply stated textbook. Not merely unreadable, it is compre-
hensible only to one who already understands the subject and is searching, 
not for clarification, but for ways of• stating a position or for additional 
case ammunition to bolster that position. Devoid of examples with flesh 
on their bones, full of the majority and minority rules in traditional 
"most jurisdictions . . . many courts, however . . . but a few cases 
hold . . . " style, achieving compactness by cryptic statement rather 
than by elimination of non-essentials, it has all the imagination and fire of 
1. P. iii. 
2. P .. 2. 
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the average law review note. It is miles away from the type of text for 
which Karl Llewellyn has been beating the drum-a text which "seeks to 
reduce a difficult matter to a deep but simple presentation, the kind of 
thing a student needs (1) to introduce him to the subject; (2) to help 
him, while he is studying the subject, and (3) to solidify everything when 
he reviews the subject. Or to save him the need of taking a course in the 
subject." 8 _ 
Can a text such as Llewellyn describes be written in the field of 
Contracts ? I concede that it would be a difficult task. I also concede 
that it could be achieved only at the expense of systematic statement of 
every aspect of every "fundamental principle." But that it can be done 
in a field of equal difficulty is demonstrated by such a rare article as 
Fred Rodell's A Primer on Interstate Tazation.4 If it can be done there, 
it can be done here. 
Such a textbook could accurately be titled : Fundamental Principles 
of the Law of Contracts. For it would present meaningful principles in 
a meaningful fashion. It would explain one principle--not in terms of 
another principle, equally confusing and meaningless-but in terms of how 
men behave and institutions operate and courts respond to societal pres-
sures. It would be content to state "rules" which covered less than the 
totality of situations, leaving dissimilar situations to be covered by 
different rules. It would, in other words, refuse to construct or to support 
a complicated system of generalizations merely to e..'Ctend the illusion of 
inevitability to the maximum number of questions on which cour~s have 
spoken. Unencumbered by inconsequential detail and unobscured by 
senseless verbiage, it would enable a strident to get a real grasp of what 
courts are doing and why. That is the sort of job Professor Grismore 
might have done. Until a text writer is found who is willing to do it, 
further publication of textbooks in the field of Contracts should be dis-
couraged. 
Addison Mueller.t 
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CAsEs AND TEXT ON THE LAw OF \tVILLs. By W. Barton Leach. Second 
Edition. Published jointly by the Editor, Harvard Law School, 
Cambridge, and The Law School Press, Los Angeles, 1947: Pp. :A.'"Vi, 
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CAsEs AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF DECEDENTs' EsTATEs. 
By Max Rheinstein. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 
1947. Pp. xiii, 1295. $8.50. 
At the turn of the century J ohh Chipman Gray ruled over the realm 
of Property with undisputed sway. His six-volume casebook on Property 
was accepted as the standard text wherever the case system had found 
its way. Formidable as it looked, it made no attempt to cover the wide 
field of property on which equity based its jurisdiction nor to include 
3. HANDBOOK, THE AssociATION oF AMERICAN LAw ScHOOLS 22 (1946). 
4. 44 YALE L. J. 1166 (1935). 
t Associate Professor, Yale School of Law. 
